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In cyberspace, attackers commonly infect computer systems with malware to gain
capabilities such as remote access, keylogging, and stealth. Many malware samples include
rootkit functionality to hide attacker activities on the target system. After detection, users
can remove the rootkit and associated malware from the system with commercial tools.
This research describes, implements, and evaluates a clean boot method using two
partitions to detect rootkits on a system. One partition is potentially infected with a rootkit
while the other is clean. The method obtains directory listings of the potentially infected
operating system from each partition and compares the lists to find hidden files. While the
clean boot method is similar to other cross-view detection techniques, this method is unique
because it uses a clean partition of the same system as the clean operating system, rather
than external media. The method produces a 0% false positive rate and a 40.625% true
positive rate. In operation, the true positive rate should increase because the experiment
produces limitations that prevent many rootkits from working properly.
Limitations such as incorrect rootkit setup and rootkits that detect VMware prevent the
method from detecting rootkit behavior in this experiment. Vulnerabilities of the method
include the assumption that the system restore folder is clean and the assumption that the
clean partition is clean. This thesis provides recommendations for more effective rootkit
detection.
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ROOTKIT DETECTION USING A CROSS-VIEW
CLEAN BOOT METHOD
I. Introduction
Computer systems are vulnerable to attack. Users, administrators, and policy makers
must take defensive measures to prevent attacks. Such defensive measures include using
AntiVirus (AV) software, implementing firewalls, and practicing safe Internet browsing
habits. Sometimes attacks get through those measures, though, and insert malicious code
onto the user’s system. When the code hides from the user, the threat is often difficult to
find and remove. The method presented in this thesis assists in finding rootkits, the stealth
mechanism for many of these threats.
1.1 Problem Definition
In cyberspace, attackers often hide their presence by intercepting data before the user
sees it [13]. Rootkits function as the stealth capability for an attacker’s malicious code.
If a user does not detect a rootkit, the malware the rootkit hides can negatively impact
the computer system’s confidentiality, availability, and integrity. The malware can steal
information and send it to an attacker, destroy files and software on the system, or modify
the users’ data without their knowledge. Immediate rootkit detection is necessary to remove
the threat before the protected malware causes extensive damage.
Because rootkits hide their presence, detecting them is difficult. The information
presented to the user about the contents of a system may be filtered by a rootkit, potentially
deceiving the user. Detection methods implement various techniques to assist human
operators in discovering rootkits. These techniques, described fully in Section 2.3, range
1
from searching for specific byte patterns in potential malware to using external hardware
to monitor system activities. Cross-view detection is a technique that compares two views
of an operating system, noting unexpected differences as indications of a rootkit.
The rootkit detection method presented in this thesis implements the cross-view
detection technique. The method compares the directory listing from the potentially
infected operating system (OS) to an uncompromised, external OS. In this method, the
OSs reside on the same hard disk to provide dual-boot functionality. Configuring a system
for dual-boot eliminates the need for external media, such as a Compact Disk (CD), to run
this cross-view rootkit detection method. The dual-boot environment is simple to maintain
after setup. In this experiment, the disk contains Windows and Linux partitions. This
division provides the user with the ability to execute the method at any time, rather than
only when the external media is available. A user or set of users can use this detection
method operationally if applied in this manner. This setup also allows a user to run the
method on multiple systems simultaneously.
Other researchers have done similar work with cross-view based rootkit detection,
described in detail in Section 2.3.3. While some of those methods detect hidden processes,
this method detects hidden files [21, 22, 27]. Other methods detect hidden files but use
different media for the clean view of the system [7, 9, 34]. This method is a self-contained
clean boot detection system that works on Windows XP, where the clean OS already resides
on another partition on the computer. The experiment uses Windows XP as the tainted
OS because more working rootkit samples exist for Windows XP than Windows Vista or
Windows 7.
In this implementation, the user initially sets up the system with a Windows partition
and an Ubuntu partition. The system only accesses the Ubuntu partition for rootkit
detection. The method obtains a directory listing of the Windows partition from the
Windows partition, reboots into the Ubuntu partition, obtains a directory listing of the
2
Windows partition from the Ubuntu partition, and compares the lists. Differences in the
lists, other than certain expected differences described in Section 4.3, indicate rootkit
activity.
1.2 Research Goals and Hypothesis
The goals of this research are to:
• determine the effectiveness of the clean boot rootkit detection method,
• identify the types of rootkits the method detects,
• determine the characteristics of undetected rootkits, and
• find the time required to detect a rootkit using this method.
The hypothesis is that the clean boot method will detect more rootkits than other methods,
but will take longer to detect them.
1.3 Contributions
The significant contributions this thesis makes are that it:
• summarizes previous rootkit detection research, based on detection category (§2.4,
Table 2.1),
• presents an operational implementation of the clean boot detection method, described
in Chapter 3, and its results (§4.1),
• details the limitations of the method to indicate potential problems and areas for
improvement (§4.2),
• provides recommendations for defensive measures to protect a system from rootkits
(§4.4), and
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• tests the method against a larger number of samples than previous research tests, with
the full list of test rootkits and their hashes available in Appendix C.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This document contains five chapters. Chapter II is a literature review, which discusses
the background of rootkits, rootkit stealth techniques, and rootkit detection techniques.
This chapter summarizes the previous research done in rootkit detection and categorizes
those into the five rootkit detection techniques.
Chapter III is the experiment methodology for evaluating the clean boot method
presented in this thesis. This chapter describes the process used to implement and test the
method. The chapter provides instructions for the system setup and rootkit setup required
to reproduce the experiments.
Chapter IV presents the results of the method, interprets the experimental results,
explains failures, and provides timing results for the method. The chapter also explains
limitations of the method, vulnerabilities an attacker can exploit, and recommendations for
protecting the system.
Chapter V concludes the thesis, summarizing the findings and contributions. This
chapter also summarizes the limitations of the method, describes ways to operationalize
the method, and presents areas of future work for investigation.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter covers the background of rootkits, rootkit stealth techniques, and current
research on rootkit detection techniques. Section 2.1 discusses the definition of the term
“rootkit,” the modes in which rootkits run, and the difference between persistent and
memory-based rootkits. Three common stealth techniques exist that rootkits use to hide
their presence, described in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 summarizes the five major rootkit
detection categories and the previous research completed in each area.
2.1 Rootkits
A rootkit is a set of tools that enable an attacker to maintain administrative access on
a system without detection [13]. The term “rootkit” comes from the terms “root,” the most
powerful user on a UNIX system, and “kit,” a set of programs and code. The identifying
quality of rootkits is that they hide their presence on an infected system. Rootkits are not
malicious by nature, but become so when executed with malicious intent. For example,
rootkits often hide malware. The term “malware” is a compound of “malicious software,”
and describes code that modifies the behavior of a system without the user’s knowledge or
consent [30].
2.1.1 Types of Rootkits.
Five classifications for rootkits exist in academia [14]. The location in the operating
system where the rootkit operates determines these classifications and the capabilities of
the rootkit. In order from least privileged to most privileged, the classifications are user
mode rootkit, kernel mode rootkit, bootkit, hypervisor rootkit, and firmware rootkit.
The term “user mode” refers to the Windows privilege mode system [1]. The privilege
modes correspond to the access control rings of an Intel x86 processor, shown in Figure 2.1
[4]. Ring 0 is the most privileged of the rings, and Ring 3 is the least privileged. Software
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programs assigned to a certain ring cannot access lower numbered rings, except through OS
constructs. User mode programs and rootkits execute in Ring 3. Many user mode rootkits
hide in running applications through the use of import address table hooking, described in
Section 2.2.1. User mode rootkits can also run as a separate application.
Figure 2.1: Privilege rings [1]
“Kernel mode” refers to programs and rootkits that run in Ring 0 [1]. Everything
running in kernel mode has access to all processor instructions and memory. A common
method of implementing kernel mode rootkits is to make the rootkit a loadable kernel
module [19]. The malicious module replaces a legitimate module by taking its place
in the system call table or modifying the pointer to the legitimate module so it points
to the malicious one. The malicious module often implements the functions of the
legitimate module so the system still runs correctly, but any information returned to the
user passes through the rootkit first. The rootkit checks the information sent to the user and
removes anything that indicates the rootkit’s presence. Another method of implementing
kernel mode rootkits is to insert the rootkit code directly into a legitimate module. This
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method produces similar results to the method of replacing the module completely, but the
modification is more likely to survive a kernel reboot. The modification is vulnerable to
detection by integrity checkers [19] (described in Section 2.3.4). Kernel rootkits can use
System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) hooking and Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT)
hooking (described in Section 2.2.1). These rootkits are much more difficult to detect, but
behavior based detection techniques (explained in Section 2.3.2) can often identify them.
The most evasive kernel mode rootkits implement Direct Kernel Object Manipulation
(DKOM) to modify data structures in the kernel [35] (described in Section 2.2.3).
Bootkits are kernel mode rootkits, but they specifically modify the boot sequence [14].
Bootkits can replace the boot loader with a compromised version or modify the Master
Boot Record (MBR). Stoned Bootkit replaces the boot loader so the Basic Input/Output
System (BIOS) loads the bootkit upon startup [18]. Stoned then inserts itself into memory
through OS hooks and patches. Stoned is a bootkit base, giving developers a platform
to write the boot software specific to their needs. VBootkit demonstrates the capability of
using a custom boot sector to execute bootkit code on Windows Vista [20]. VBootkit hooks
the interrupt for disk reads (INT 13), reads the MBR to find the signature for bootmgr.exe,
and patches bootmgr.exe while the boot sector loads. VBootkit disables full volume
encryption and patches Multilingual User Interface (MUI) resources. eEye BootRoot is
a bootkit that patches OS files as they load and reserves a place in memory for its own
code [32]. Like VBootkit, eEye BootRoot hooks the disk read interrupt and scans for code
signatures to find the OS loader. Alureon is different from other bootkits because it modifies
the MBR and works on 64-bit Windows 7 [10]. Alureon bypasses Windows 7’s driver
signing requirement by lowering the boot setting value of LoadIntegrityCheckPolicy.
Hypervisor rootkits and virtual machine-based rootkits strive to run the rootkit as
a separate OS from the target [31]. Figure 2.2 shows that in software virtualization,
the rootkit runs the target OS as a Virtual Machine (VM), with the rootkit running the
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Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM). In hardware virtualization, the rootkit and the target OS
both reside in hardware, with the rootkit running a hypervisor. Virtualization allows the
rootkit to intercept all hardware calls that the system makes. Proof-of-concept prototype
rootkits demonstrate these techniques [14]. One virtual machine-based rootkit is SubVirt,
developed by Microsoft and the University of Michigan. SubVirt modifies the boot
sequence and installs a VMM on the host hardware of the victim, underneath the target
OS. SubVirt then runs the target OS as a VM. Only low-level and offline scans detect this
type of rootkit because the target OS is unaware that it is in a VM [17]. Blue Pill, created
by Rutkowska, is a hypervisor rootkit that does not modify the BIOS or system files as
SubVirt does [31]. Blue Pill installs by inserting a driver into the kernel that enables AMD-
V’s Secure Virtual Machine (SVM). The driver then sets up the hypervisor and loads the
hypervisor into memory, allowing the rootkit to intercept hardware calls to and from the
target OS.
Figure 2.2: Software and hardware virtualization [31]
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Firmware rootkits hide in hardware and firmware, such as the system BIOS
or a network card. Heasman presents two firmware rootkits that persist in the
Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI) BIOS and the Peripheral Component
Interconnect (PCI) bus [11, 12]. The ACPI rootkit survives reboots, re-installation of the
same OS, and installation of a new OS [12]. The ACPI rootkit is difficult to detect and
remove because the rootkit code is within the BIOS. The PCI rootkit hides on the PCI bus
and executes while the system BIOS is initializing Read-only Memory (ROM) [11]. The
rootkit must maintain control throughout the OS start up to run on the system. Firmware
rootkits survive reboots of the system because they reside on hardware.
2.1.2 Persistence.
A rootkit’s ability to survive a reboot of the system determines its persistence [6].
Two classifications for persistence exist: memory-based rootkits and persistent rootkits.
Persistent rootkits survive a reboot by storing their code somewhere permanent on the
system. The code must be accessible after the reboot. The rootkit must also hook the
boot sequence so its code loads into memory and executes after the reboot. Memory-based
rootkits do not survive a reboot. The code resides in memory, making it more difficult to
detect. Some systems, like servers, remain online for extended periods of time, so memory-
based rootkits can still have damaging effects on these systems.
2.2 Rootkit Stealth Techniques
Rootkits hide their presence in many ways. The three most common are hooking,
patching, and DKOM [13]. Section 2.2.1 explains hooking and describes hooking
techniques in “userland” and kernel space. Section 2.2.2 describes the implementation
and uses of patches. Section 2.2.3 discusses DKOM and methods to accomplish it.
2.2.1 Hooking.
Rootkits commonly use hooking as a stealth technique [13]. In user mode, rootkits
utilize two types of hooks: Import Address Table (IAT) hooks and inline function hooks.
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In kernel mode, rootkits utilize IDT hooks and SSDT hooks. Figure 2.3 follows a function
call from the application to the hardware. The figure shows the different places in the
function where a rootkit could hook its code.
Figure 2.3: Windows potential hook locations [26]
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IAT hooks take advantage of function calls in applications [13]. When an application
makes a function call to another binary, it looks up the address of the function in an IAT.
The rootkit parses through the application to find a function to hook and replaces the
function’s address in the IAT with the rootkit’s address. The rootkit jumps to the address of
the original function after running the rootkit code, as shown in Figure 2.4. At runtime, the
application executes the rootkit code before executing the actual function. The user does
not detect the rootkit’s execution because the real function still runs as expected.
Figure 2.4: Normal execution path vs. hooked execution path for an IAT hook [13]
Inline function hooks are more powerful than IAT hooks because they overwrite the
code of the target function [13]. Overwriting the function’s code guarantees that the
rootkit code will run, even if the system modifies the IAT. The first five bytes of most
32-bit Windows functions, called the preamble, are the same. An unconditional jump
also takes five bytes. A rootkit using inline function hooks replaces five bytes, often the
preamble, with an unconditional jump to the rootkit code. The five bytes can be anywhere
in the function, but must replace full instructions to allow the function to execute without
crashing. In Figure 2.5, the detour function represents the rootkit code. The rootkit saves
the five bytes it replaces in the previous step as the trampoline function. The detour function
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calls the trampoline function after running the rootkit code. The trampoline runs the five
bytes the rootkit replaced and jumps to the target function. The target function returns the
results to the detour function, allowing the rootkit to alter the results before returning them
to the source function.
Figure 2.5: Inline function hook [13]
IDT hooks manipulate the call from the IDT to the SSDT [13]. As shown in Figure
2.6, the system calls the IDT when an interrupt occurs in an application. Certain interrupts,
such as 0x2E, require the IDT to call the SSDT. The rootkit intercepts the call to the
SSDT before it reaches KiSystemService. IDT hooks cannot filter the data that the SSDT
returns because the rootkit does not regain control after calling the SSDT, but the hooks
can still block requests from certain software applications like firewalls.
The SSDT hook works similarly to the IDT hook. The SSDT contains the addresses
of the system services in Windows [13]. When a user-mode application requires a kernel
service, KiSystemService calls the SSDT to obtain the address of the service. The
SSDT calls the function at that address and returns the information from the function to
the application. A rootkit using an SSDT hook modifies one or more of the entries in the
SSDT to point to the rootkit function instead of the intended function, as shown in Figure
2.7. The rootkit can return false information to the application rather than the information
the real function would provide. For example, if the real function returns a list of running
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Figure 2.6: IDT hook [16]
processes, the rootkit can return that list after removing the rootkit’s processes, effectively
hiding its presence.
2.2.2 Patching.
Patching is similar to hooking because both add the rootkit code into running
applications [13]. Patching does not modify the call tables like hooking does, making
patching less vulnerable to detection methods that look for changes in the call tables.
Patching overwrites software to change the way the software performs. Developers use
several patching methods.
The first patching method is to change the source code, recompile it, and run the
software again [13]. To accomplish this, the attacker must obtain the source code, which is
difficult with most software because developers do not want others modifying the software.
If the attacker can obtain the source code, he can modify the program in any way.
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Figure 2.7: SSDT hook [16]
The second patching method is to change the bytes in the binary using a hexadecimal
editor or other software [13]. Attackers can change the destination of jumps or turn off
security bits to remove software protection. Figure 2.8 demonstrates detour patching,
which modifies the control flow around a function. At the point of branch modification,
the attacker modifies the bytes of the function to jump to the rootkit code. When the rootkit
code completes, it jumps back to the end of the function. The part of the function that is
between the jump and the end never executes because the rootkit replaces it.
The last patching method is to change the values of data in memory at runtime [13].
These patches require an attacker to know the structure of the program’s memory and where
the data resides. Modifying the data values can change program logic and how the program
behaves. Attackers often use this technique to alter data in games, such as the number of
lives the user maintains.
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Patches can overwrite code entirely, as shown in Figure 2.8, or overwrite the existing
code to jump to a new location, run the rootkit and original code, and jump back to the
branch in the function. Legitimate uses of patches, such as fixing security problems,
hinder the user from determining if a patch is malicious or not. To determine if a patch
is malicious, users can run AV software or upload the patch to VirusTotal [33].
Figure 2.8: Modification of control flow with a patch [13]
2.2.3 Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM).
While hooking is an effective way to hide a rootkit, it is well known and easily
detectable, though it is difficult to differentiate between a benign hook and a malicious
one [13]. DKOM is more difficult to detect than hooking because DKOM bypasses the
kernel’s object manager, skipping any access checks that the kernel should do. DKOM
only affects objects in memory, so it cannot hide files, but it can hide processes, ports, and
device drivers.
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Figure 2.9 shows how DKOM can hide processes. In the kernel object structure, the
EPROCESS block contains information about processes running on the system [16]. The
top set of EPROCESS blocks in the figure shows the typical setup of those processes.
Each process has a forward link (FLINK) that points to the next process and a backward
link (BLINK) that points to the previous process [1]. To hide the process in the middle,
the rootkit changes the forward link for the previous process to point to the next process
relative to the hidden process. The rootkit also modifies the backward link for the next
process to point to the previous process relative to the hidden process. Lastly, the rootkit
removes the hidden process’s forward and backward links. The bottom set of EPROCESS
blocks shows that after making these modifications, the middle process is hidden because
no processes link to it.
Figure 2.9: DKOM [1]
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2.3 Rootkit Detection Techniques
Five categories of rootkit detection techniques exist: signature, behavior, cross-view,
integrity, and hardware [5]. The following sections describe each of these techniques and
common rootkit detection tools utilizing those techniques.
2.3.1 Signature-based Detection.
Signature-based detection is the most common method for detecting rootkits [8].
When AV authors obtain a piece of malware, they identify a “signature” that is unique to
the byte pattern of the malware and place those patterns in a signature database. Detection
software compares the signatures in the database to the byte pattern of potential malware on
the system [1]. If there is a match, the database identifies the malware. The disadvantage
of signature-based detection is that it only works for known malware. Detection software
will not identify any malware that does not match a signature in the database. Another
disadvantage is that an attacker could disable the security software before installing the
rootkit. A distinct advantage of signature based detection is that it works well for detecting
known rootkits that hide in memory [26]. The other detection methods do not detect
rootkits in memory as well as signature-based techniques.
2.3.2 Behavior-based Detection.
Behavior-based rootkit detection often detects new rootkits that do not yet have known
signatures [8]. This detection method determines what behavior is normal for a given
system, then looks for anomalies. Those anomalies can be indicative of malware on a
system.
2.3.2.1 VICE.
VICE is a rootkit detection tool that detects hooks and patches [3]. VICE looks for
anomalies in the SSDT in kernel mode and the address space of each application in user
mode. Those anomalies indicate potentially malicious behavior, even from new rootkits.
However, legitimate uses for hooks exist, such as DLL forwarding [5]. VICE produces
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a large number of false positives because the method cannot determine the difference
between a benign hook and a malicious one.
2.3.2.2 Patchfinder.
Patchfinder is a proof-of-concept rootkit detection tool that analyzes the behavior of a
rootkit while it is running. Patchfinder compares the number of instructions that common
services should execute to the number of instructions those services are executing [5].
Patchfinder creates a baseline for those services when the system boots, determining what
the instruction count should be. The x86 processor runs in “single step” mode to count
the instructions, which halts execution after each instruction completes, calls an interrupt
service routine, and updates the instruction count. If the instruction count is thousands
higher than the baseline during runtime, that indicates a rootkit’s presence [28]. Patchfinder
cannot detect rootkits that use DKOM because it only looks for hooks that add more
instructions to a service’s execution. Patchfinder only works when the system is clean
at startup.
2.3.2.3 Proactive Detection.
Bravo et al. present a method for detecting rootkits that hook the SSDT [2]. The
method hooks the page fault handler in the IDT and hides the page where the SSDT resides
by setting the memory pages to “not-present.” When a rootkit modifies the SSDT, the
method detects the write access and identifies which module made the modification by
analyzing the stack. Identifying the module that made the modification allows the user to
determine if the hook is benign or malicious.
2.3.2.4 Binary Analysis.
Kruegel et al. present a rootkit detection method that observes a module at load time to
determine if the module’s behavior resembles the behavior of a rootkit [19]. If the module
writes to a memory area where legitimate modules do not write or if the module calculates
an address in kernel space using a “forbidden kernel symbol reference” [19] and writes
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to that address, the method identifies that module as a rootkit. When tested, the method
produced a 0% false positive rate for legitimate modules and a 0% false negative rate for
rootkit modules.
2.3.3 Cross-view-based Detection.
Cross-view rootkit detection obtains two different views of the system and compares
them to find anomalies [1]. The technique obtains a high level view of the system from an
area that is susceptible to manipulation by malware. The high level view will not report
anything that the rootkit hides. The other view can be from an uncontaminated external
operating system or low level of the infected system. The method accepts the external view
as the true view of the system because it shows what is actually on the system rather than
assuming what the system reports is true.
2.3.3.1 Strider GhostBuster.
Strider GhostBuster is a tool that contains an in-the-box and out-of-the-box solution
for cross-view rootkit detection [34]. The in-the-box solution performs a high level and
low level scan of files and processes. The low level scan obtains its information from
the Master File Table, Raw Hive Files, and Kernel Process List. A disadvantage of this
method is that rootkits running with sufficient privileges could interfere with the low level
scan. The out-of-the-box solution obtains file listings and registry entries from within the
infected machine, then scans the infected OS from a clean OS, specifically the Windows
Preinstallation Environment CD. Because the rootkit is not running when the clean OS is
performing the scan, the rootkit cannot hide its presence or interfere with the scan. The
disadvantage to this method is that out-of-the-box detection is less convenient than the
inside-the-box solution.
2.3.3.2 RootkitRevealer.
RootkitRevealer is a Windows Sysinternals tool that works on Windows XP and
Windows Server 2003 [7]. RootkitRevealer uses a high level and a low level scan to detect
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differences in the file listings. The high level scan is of the Windows API and the low level
scan is of the registry hive or the file system volume’s raw data. RootkitRevealer detects
any rootkits that manipulate the Windows API. RootkitRevealer does not detect rootkits
like Fu that do not hide their files.
2.3.3.3 Klister.
Klister is a tool that detects rootkits that exploit DKOM [5]. Klister achieves this
by comparing the processes running to the list of threads running on the system. Klister
obtains the list of threads through the dispatcher database, then determines to which process
each thread belongs [27]. Matching the threads to processes creates a true list of processes
running in the system, which Klister compares to the list of processes reported by the
system. Differences in the lists indicate that a rootkit may be present.
2.3.3.4 Kernel Rootkit Trojan Detector (KeRTD).
KeRTD is an online cross-view detection tool that detects hidden processes [21].
KeRTD compares the Access Control List to a KeRTD Process and Driver List on the
potentially infected system. KeRTD creates and updates the Process and Driver List every
time the system creates or deletes a process or loads a driver file into the kernel. The
Process and Driver List is the trusted list, while the Access Control List may be modified
by a rootkit. KeRTD blocks the hidden processes and drivers to limit further rootkit activity.
2.3.3.5 Detection Using the PspCidTable.
Nanavati et al. present a rootkit detection method using the PspCidTable to detect
hidden processes on a Windows OS [22]. The method obtains a trusted view of the
processes on the system from the PspCidTable and other kernel structures. The method
uses ZwSystemDebugControl to read the virtual memory and obtain the list of processes.
The method obtains the tainted view of the system by calling Windows API functions
such as ZwQuerySystemInformation and listing the processes the function returns. To
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effectively hide from this detection method, a rootkit must remove itself from all kernel
structures while remaining on the lists for scheduling.
2.3.3.6 Clean Booting.
Clean booting follows the concept that the best way to find stealth malware is to
prevent the malware from hiding itself [9]. If the OS is not running, the malware is not
running, so it cannot hide files or processes from an outside source. For Windows 9x
systems, the clean boot method boots the system into DOS mode from the boot menu and
examines the file system. For Windows ME, clean booting requires external tools to boot
the system into DOS mode. For NT systems, malware can infect low level drivers, so the
external view must be from a different partition or disk.
2.3.4 Integrity-based Detection.
Integrity-based detection compares a trusted baseline, obtained when the system was
clean, to the current view of memory or the file system [5]. Any differences can indicate a
rootkit’s presence on the machine. This technique is often unable to determine the source
of the malicious activity.
2.3.4.1 Tripwire.
Tripwire is an integrity checker for UNIX systems released in 1992 to aid in intrusion
detection. Tripwire creates a baseline database containing file information at system
initialization, while the system is clean. After initialization, Tripwire can create a new
database at any time and compare it to the one obtained at initialization. Differences in
the databases indicate system changes. The method analyzes these system changes to
determine if Tripwire should generate a report. Users can update the baseline database
if the file information legitimately changes [15].
2.3.4.2 System Virginity Verifier.
System Virginity Verifier (SVV) is a detection tool that looks for code integrity [29].
SVV compares the code sections of a system Dynamic Link Library (DLL) or driver in
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memory to the Portable Executable (PE) files associated with that code on disk. Many
programs do not modify their code, so if they do it indicates an anomaly. SVV analyzes
the anomalies and classifies them based on the type of code added.
2.3.5 Hardware-based Detection.
Hardware-based rootkit detection originated from the idea that external hardware
would not compete with the rootkit for resources like software-based detection does [8].
External hardware can monitor system activities at a lower level than most software can.
Hardware-based detection has the advantage that most rootkits are unable to modify what
the hardware sees because the hardware utilizes an external OS.
2.3.5.1 Copilot.
Copilot is a separate PCI card that a user installs on a computer to monitor the kernel
and operating system [26]. It runs on a live system and accesses memory using Direct
Memory Access, which allows Copilot to search for rootkit code in memory [23]. Copilot
is effective because it does not rely on the compromised OS.
2.3.5.2 Capturing Random Access Memory (RAM).
Tribble, created by Grand Idea Studios, is a PCI expansion card that captures the RAM
on a running system for analysis [8]. BBN Technologies created a similar hardware device
that copies the RAM of a live workstation or server. The user can analyze these images
after capture.
2.4 Summary
This chapter defines the term rootkit and describes a rootkit’s basic functionality.
The five different types of rootkits and levels of rootkit persistence provide background
information related to the problem. Rootkits use stealth technologies such as hooking,
patching, and DKOM. The five categories of rootkit detection techniques are signature,
behavior, cross-view, integrity, and hardware based detection. Previous research in each
category provides a starting point for this research.
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The clean boot method described in this thesis is a cross-view technique, marked
with an asterisk in Table 2.1. The method differs from other cross-view detection work
in many ways. Klister, KeRTD, and the PspCidTable method use cross-view detection
to find hidden processes, while this method finds hidden files. RootkitRevealer takes
two file system views from inside the infected machine and compares them, while this
method compares one internal and one external view of the file system. The clean boot
technique presented by Erdélyi is for earlier versions of Windows, while this method works
on Windows XP. Strider GhostBuster uses the clean boot technique on Windows XP with
external media as the clean operating system, while this method is self-contained. Table
2.1 classifies each paper referenced by the detection technique the paper presents.
Table 2.1: Reference by detection technique
Detection Technique Academic Research Other References *
Signature-based [1] [8, 26]
Behavior-based [2, 3, 19] [5, 28]
Cross-view-based [9, 21, 22, 27, 34] [7] *
Integrity-based [15, 29] [5]
Hardware-based [23] [8, 26]
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III. Methodology
This chapter presents the methodology for implementing and testing the clean boot
rootkit detection method. Section 3.1 defines the goals, hypothesis, and approach to
solving the problem, while Section 3.2 describes the boundaries of the system. If the
system produces false positives or false negatives, as Section 3.3 describes, the system
fails. Section 3.4 describes the workload of the system. The experiment measures two
metrics of performance, which Section 3.5 defines. Four system parameters, explained in
Section 3.6, may affect the results. The experiment varies the two factors that Section 3.7
describes. Section 3.8 explains the evaluation techniques of the method. The statistical
design, rootkit setup, and system setup required for the experiment, as Section 3.9 details,
allow researchers to repeat the experiment. Section 3.10 summarizes the chapter.
3.1 Problem Definition
Rootkits pose a threat to computer systems because of their stealth. Early rootkit
detection assists users in identifying and removing malicious code from the system. This
experiment analyzes the effectiveness of a clean boot technique as the rootkit detection
method.
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis.
The main goal of this effort is to determine the effectiveness of offline rootkit detection
using a clean boot method. The effectiveness of the method is the percentage of rootkits the
method can detect. Another goal is to identify the types of rootkits that the method detects,
specifically user mode, kernel mode, or boot mode. Through analysis of the experimental
data, the user determines and documents the characteristics of undetected rootkits. An
additional goal of the research is to determine the detection process time required by the
clean boot method.
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The clean boot method should detect more rootkits than other detection methods
because many of those detection methods are susceptible to manipulation by the rootkits
and may only see what the rootkits report. Alternatively, rootkits cannot manipulate
the data when the system is offline, so the method can analyze the rootkits in a trusted
environment. The method will not detect rootkits that do not hide any files because this
method observes anomalies in the file system. The offline rootkit detection method should
take longer than other methods because the method gathers the information on the infected
partition, then copies the directory listing to a different partition for analysis.
3.1.2 Approach.
Each test installs a rootkit on an identical system in VMware. The experiment runs
the clean boot rootkit detection method on each test. This experimental setup satisfies the
goals of detecting malware quickly and efficiently, as well as determining the effectiveness
of the offline rootkit detection method. The comparison also tests the hypothesis that the
clean boot method requires more time to detect rootkits than other methods.
The implementation requires an initial computer system setup, as described in Section
3.9.3. In this experiment, the setup creates two partitions: a Windows partition and an
Ubuntu partition. The user operates in the Windows partition for everything other than
rootkit detection. The method uses the Ubuntu partition as the clean operating system.
After the user sets up the implementation of the method, anyone can execute the method at
any time from within the Windows partition. When executed, the implementation obtains
a directory listing of the C: drive on the Windows file system, reboots the computer into
the Ubuntu partition, mounts the Windows partition, and obtains a second directory listing
of the Windows file system. The directory listings come from each OS running its “dir”
command recursively over the filesystem. The method then compares the two file system
listings and records the differences in a file on an external device to facilitate timing data
collection. Figure 3.1 visually represents this process. Because Windows adds files to
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certain folders during shutdown, the implementation expects these differences and ignores
them. Any other hidden files or directories indicate that a rootkit is on the system.
Figure 3.1: Implementation of rootkit detection method
3.2 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the rootkit detection system. The components in
the system are the detection method and the disk that contains the two partitions. These
partitions are the tainted partition, which a rootkit may modify, and the detection partition,
which produces the offline data. The detection partition must have access to the tainted
partition’s files, and the user must encrypt or otherwise protect the detection partition so
the tainted partition cannot affect it. During system setup, the Ubuntu installer presents an
option to encrypt the partition. The detection method is the Component Under Test (CUT).
Figure 3.2 presents the SUT.
3.3 System Services
The service this system provides is the detection of rootkits and presentation of
associated timing data. Two possible outcomes of this service exist. The first is success,
where the method completes and returns correct detection and timing results. The second
is failure, where the system produces false positives or false negatives. A false positive in
this experiment is when the method detects a rootkit but no rootkits reside on the system. A
false negative in this experiment is when the method does not detect a rootkit but a rootkit
resides on the system.
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Figure 3.2: Rootkit detection system
3.4 Workload
The primary workload components of the system are the rootkits placed on the tainted
operating system. Each rootkit changes different parts of the computer system, which
influences the method detection rate. The size of the rootkit and its CPU utilization
are part of the workload and affect the time the system takes to detect the rootkit. The
size of the hard drive is another component of the workload. The method copies the
file system on the computer, so it takes longer to detect a rootkit on a larger hard drive.
For this experiment, the size of the hard drive remains constant to prevent that workload
from affecting the timing data for different rootkits. The final part of the workload is
the computer’s background CPU utilization. The detection method runs when no other
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programs are running on the computer to minimize the variation in background CPU
utilization.
3.5 Performance Metrics
This system has two metrics of performance. The primary metric is the accuracy of
detecting rootkits, calculated as
Accuracy =
# Rootkits Tested - # False Positives - # False Negatives
# Rootkits Tested
(3.1)
The accuracy is the measure of the effectiveness of the method. The secondary metric
for the system is the time, in seconds, required to detect a rootkit. The starting point for
the time metric is when the VM powers on. The restart time is when the GRUB boot
menu appears after the tainted partition completes shutdown procedures. The stopping
point is when the VM completes shutdown procedures. The time metric provides baseline
information on timing characteristics for the method. The VMware log file associated with
the VM provides the timing information. Table 3.1 lists the timing commands from the
log file. The GRUB boot menu delays the reboot by 10s, which the experiment subtracts
from the final timing results. The delay is 10s because that gives the user adequate time to
choose an OS, but the delay could be any length of time.
Table 3.1: Timing commands
Timing Point Command in VMware log
Start PowerOn
Restart cpu reset: soft (mode 1)
Shutdown FileTrack Exit: done
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3.6 System Parameters
Table 3.2 describes the four system parameters that could affect the responses: the
tainted OS, detection OS, Central Processing Unit (CPU) speed, and platform. Section 3.4
describes the workload parameters.
Table 3.2: System parameters
System Parameter Description
Tainted OS The type of OS the tainted partition runs. The experiment
runs tests on two OSs: 32-bit Windows XP Service Pack 3
and 32-bit Windows 7.
Detection OS The type of OS the detection partition runs. The detection
OS remains constant as Ubuntu version 12.04.
CPU Speed The CPU speed remains constant at 2.8 GHz throughout the
experiments to minimize effects on timing data.
Platform The VM runs on VMware Workstation 9.0. The host runs 64-
bit Windows 7. The platform remains constant throughout
the experiments.
3.7 Factors
The factors of the experiment are the two parameters that the tests vary: the tainted
OS and the rootkit on the system. The tainted OS factor has two levels, one for each OS
tested. The rootkit factor has 39 levels, one for each rootkit not in the validation set. Table
3.3 describes these factors and their levels.
3.8 Evaluation Technique
This experiment uses measurement as its evaluation technique. The method runs on a
Windows XP VM set up as a host machine would be for detection. The virtual disk contains




Tainted OS Windows XP SP3
Windows 7
The tainted OS. The method should produce the same results
for accuracy on both OSs because the method is not specific
to an OS and should be usable on all OS types. The timing
results should also remain the same on both OSs because
they have the same CPU speed.
Rootkit 1 of 39 rootkits This research tests the offline rootkit detection method
against the 42 rootkits listed in Appendix C. The experiment
runs a test with no rootkit prior to each test with a rootkit,
testing the system without a rootkit 42 times. However,
the test with no rootkit is deterministic and provides no
additional information. The validation set consists of 3 of the
42 rootkits, so this factor has 39 levels. The experiment tests
42 rootkits because other research tests this method against
three to five rootkits.
file structure after mounting the tainted partition. The experiment runs the main tests on
Windows XP because Windows XP has more known rootkit samples than later versions of
Windows.
The experiment validates the results through measurement on a Windows 7 VM. The
Windows 7 tests use the same system setup as in the Windows XP VM and follow the same
procedures. The method should detect the same rootkits on Windows 7 as on Windows XP.
The experiment collects timing data for the Windows 7 tests and compares that data to the
timing data from the Windows XP tests of the same rootkits.
3.9 Experimental Design
This section describes the experiment’s statistical design, rootkit setup, and system
setup. The experiment’s statistical design determines the number of tests run to ensure
accurate results. The rootkit setup describes the procedure for installing the rootkits. The
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system setup configures the computer for dual-boot and allows the detection partition to
access the tainted partition.
3.9.1 Statistical Design.
This experiment follows a partial factorial design. All 39 levels of the rootkit factor
and the 3 validation tests run the detection method in a Windows XP VM. The 3 validation
tests are the rootkits Vanquish, AFX, and TDL2. Before each test with a rootkit, the
experiment runs a test without a rootkit to determine what results the method presents when
the system is clean, producing another 42 tests. Prior to running each test, the experimenter
reverts to a clean snapshot of the VM. On the Windows 7 VM, the method runs 16 times
without a rootkit and against the 16 working Windows XP rootkits. This produces a total
of 116 tests in the experiment.
This experiment is deterministic because the method either detects the rootkit or does
not detect the rootkit. If the method detects a rootkit when a rootkit resides on the machine,
the test result is a true positive. If the method fails to detect the installed rootkit, the
test result is a false negative. Conversely, a true negative result occurs when the method
correctly detects that no rootkits reside on the computer. A false positive occurs when the
method falsely detects a rootkit when no rootkits reside on the computer.
3.9.2 Rootkit Setup.
The website kernelmode.info provides the rootkits that this experiment tests [24].
The sample rootkits utilized in the experiment include the dropper for the sample. A
dropper is an executable that installs the rootkit. The dropper sets up the environment
necessary for the rootkit to run as designed. VirusTotal validates which rootkit each dropper
installs [33]. At least 30 AV vendors must detect the rootkit for the experiment to use that
rootkit as a test. On a Linux OS, the experiment validates that the dropper is a 32-bit
Portable Executable (PE32) through the “file” command.
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Certain common rootkits, such as AFX and Vanquish, have setup instructions
available. The following sections summarize those instructions. However, given the
malicious nature of the samples, many rootkits do not include setup instructions. Setup for
rootkits without instructions consists of running the executable dropper via the command
line. Some samples give additional instructions during execution, which the installer
follows when available.
3.9.2.1 AFX.
An administrator must turn off Data Execution Prevention (DEP) before running the
command to execute AFX. To install AFX, the attacker places the root.exe executable
and src folder in the folder that should be hidden. The src folder contains files
that the rootkit needs to function properly. The attacker places all files and folders that
he intends to hide in the folder containing root.exe. The attacker runs the command
“root.exe /i” on the command line to hide the folder and its contents. After installing
the rootkit, the folder hides until reboot. When the system reboots, the folder appears in
directory listings until startup completes. The folder hides again after the user refreshes its
location.
3.9.2.2 Vanquish.
Vanquish includes two executables, two setup command scripts, and a DLL. All files
must be present for Vanquish to function properly. A readme file accompanies Vanquish.
Only an administrator can set up Vanquish, as defined in the readme. The attacker executes
the command “setup do install” on the command line in the folder containing all
Vanquish files. This hides all files and folders that have “vanquish” in the name.
3.9.3 System Setup.
The experimenter must set up the system properly for the implementation to work.
The base system is a Windows XP Service Pack 3 VM in VMware. Windows XP is the
tainted OS because many available rootkits run on Windows XP. The experimenter installs
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Ubuntu 12.04 alongside Windows XP as a separate partition on the same virtual disk.
After installing Ubuntu, the user mounts the Windows partition as “/windows” in Ubuntu
using the command “sudo mount /dev/sda1 /windows”. After mounting the partition,
Ubuntu can access all files on the Windows partition. When the Windows partition runs,
Windows cannot access the files on the Ubuntu partition because the experimenter encrypts
the Ubuntu partition. Ubuntu is the default OS on the GRUB boot loader menu. The
experimenter must disable all network connections before installing any rootkits to prevent
unintentional infection of other computers on the network.
To provide accurate timing results, the user should automate the implementation. The
steps to automate the method are:
1. In Windows, the user places a shortcut to the batch file running the implementation
code in the startup folder. Appendices D and E contain the file and implementation code.
2. The user includes a command to restart the computer in the batch file after the code
is run, booting the system into the Ubuntu partition.
3. In Ubuntu, the user adds the implementation code to “Startup Applications
Preferences.” In order to shut down the system, the application must run as root. To
run the code as root automatically, the user adds the line “user ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:
ALL” to the end of the sudoers file.
4. In order to access the difference files and maintain timing integrity, the
implementation copies the files to an external USB drive. The user formats this drive to a
32-bit File Allocation Table (FAT32) system to prevent malware from moving to the host
via alternate data streams (ADSs). FAT32 is a file system that contains an index table of
file information separate from the data in the files. Because the index table only specifies
one location for each file, FAT32 does not support ADSs.
Running sample tests ensures correct system setup. First, three tests run without a
rootkit on the tainted OS. In all three tests, no differences exist between the directory
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listings after filtering out the expected differences (described in Section 4.3). Then a test
runs after installing Vanquish and hides files by naming them “vanquish.” All files that
contain “vanquish” in the name hide from the user, and the method detects the hidden files.
This validates that the system is set up correctly.
3.10 Summary
This research supports the strategic goal of detecting malware on computer systems.
The primary contribution accomplishes the tactical goal of determining the effectiveness
of the offline rootkit detection method. The SUT is the rootkit detection system, with
components of the hard drive, tainted partition, detection partition, and method, where the
CUT is the method. The service that this system provides is the detection of rootkits with
timing data. The workload given to the system consists of the rootkit, with the size and
CPU utilization of the rootkit, the size of the hard drive, and the system’s CPU utilization.
The performance metrics are rootkit detection accuracy and detection time. The
system parameters are the tainted OS, detection OS, CPU speed, and the platform. The
factors in this experiment are the tainted OS and the rootkit. The evaluation technique is
measurement of the Windows XP experiments, validated by the Windows 7 experiments.
The experimental design runs the experiment on all 42 rootkits on Windows XP and on 16
rootkits on Windows 7 as a partial factorial design, with a “no rootkit” test prior to installing
each rootkit. When the experiment completes all tests, analysis begins by finding the rootkit
detection accuracy. This analysis fulfills the goal of determining the effectiveness of this
detection method. Timing analysis provides baseline data for the detection time of this
rootkit detection method.
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IV. Results and Analysis
This chapter describes the results of the experiment and implications of those
results. Section 4.1 presents the results of the experiments and discusses the results.
Many limitations, as Section 4.2 describes, prevent the method from working as
expected. The research makes several assumptions in developing the implementation, and
Section 4.3 describes potential ways to exploit those assumptions. Section 4.4 provides
recommendations for employing this method of protection from rootkits. A company could
operationalize the method on a larger scale, as Section 4.5 describes.
4.1 Results and Discussion
The experiment produces results for the tests on the Windows XP and Windows 7
VMs. Section 4.1.1 discusses these results and explains the false negative test results.
Section 4.1.2 discusses the timing results for the tests.
4.1.1 Experimental Results.
The experiment tests the clean boot method of rootkit detection on Windows XP
against 42 rootkits, reverting to the VM’s snapshot after each test. Prior to each rootkit’s
installation, the method runs against the clean system. As shown in Table 4.1, the method
does not generate any false positives (0% false positive rate, 100% true negative rate),
assuming the clean system install is still clean.







Of the 39 rootkits not in the validation set, the method detects 13 of them and does
not detect 26 of them. This produces a 33.3% true positive rate and a 66.7% false negative
rate. Given that the method detects all rootkits in the validation set, the false negatives
are due to improper rootkit setup. Section 4.2 describes the limitations of rootkit setup.
Outside of this test environment, an attacker knows how to correctly install each rootkit he
uses. Therefore, in operation, the false negative rate should decrease because the method
detects correctly installed rootkits that provide file system protection. Table 4.2 outlines
the hidden files for the 13 detected rootkits (above the double lines), and for the validation
set (below the double lines). Some of these rootkits hide specific files, while others hide
all files in a certain directory. Four of them hide all files and folders that have a certain
string in the path. VirusTotal analyzes each rootkit before testing, providing the rootkit’s
technical name from Symantec, Kaspersky, and other AV vendors [33]. The information
obtained from these AV vendors determines the rootkit’s operating mode. Table 4.3 lists
the mode in which each rootkit runs, with the validation set below the double lines.
Three of the rootkits tested (Vanquish, AFX, and TDL2) contain instructions and
descriptions of what the rootkit hides. Vanquish validates that the system setup is correct, as
described in Section 3.9.3. When set up using the instructions in Section 3.9.2.2, Vanquish
hides all files that contain the word “vanquish” in the path. To validate this, the experiment
places files in a folder labeled “vanquish” on the desktop, then sets up the rootkit. The
user and OS cannot see any of files in that folder and the files created by Vanquish. The
method detects all of these hidden files. AFX and TDL2 constitute the validation set,
ensuring that the method works correctly. When set up using the instructions in Section
3.9.2.1, AFX hides all files and folders placed in the same folder as root.exe. To test this,
the experiment places root.exe in a folder with other files and folders. After setup, that
folder and all of its contents hide from the user, which the method correctly detects. This
variant of TDL2 creates files throughout the file system, placing the string “ytasfw” in the
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name of all. Anything with a path containing the string “ytasfw”, including user-created
files, hides from the user. The method detects all of these hidden files.



















Alureon any path containing the string “kbiwkm”
TDSS any path containing the string “seneka”
ZeroAccess WINDOWS/$BtYbubstakkJV7569$
Vanquish any path containing the string “vanquish”
TDL2 any path containing the string “ytasfw”
AFX everything in the folder where “root.exe” was run
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Table 4.3: Rootkit mode of 16 detected rootkits


















The tests produce 26 false negatives, falsely reporting that no rootkits reside on the
system during each test. When the rootkits run, ProcessHacker logs the processes created
and terminated in the background. Appendix A describes the results of the logs and
observations of the system after the execution of each rootkit. The rootkit numbers match
the hash table in Appendix C.
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4.1.1.2 Windows 7 Results.
Windows XP has more available rootkits than Windows 7, so Windows XP is the
primary platform for these tests. However, Windows 7 is currently the most commonly
used operating system [25]. The experiment tests a small number of rootkits on Windows 7
to determine the method’s effectiveness on Windows 7. The experiment tests each of the 16
rootkits that the method detected in Windows XP on Windows 7, but none of them install
correctly. All rootkit tests run on an unprivileged user account and on an administrator
account. The tests on the unprivileged user account demonstrate the benefits of Windows
7’s protection mechanisms, such as User Account Control (UAC). The experiment installs
the rootkits with the UAC on and off, as well as compatibility mode for Windows XP SP3
on and off, producing four tests for each rootkit. The administrator account obtains the
directory listing. Appendix B describes each rootkit installation attempt.
4.1.1.3 Results After Removing Invalid Tests.
Some false negatives described in Section 4.1.1.1 are due to failures in the system after
rootkit installation. The method could not run against tests 8 and 18 because the system
failed to restart correctly after rootkit installation. The tests conducted of the method in this
experiment are ineffective against rootkits 2, 3, and 30 because the rootkit applications do
not run on Windows XP. The method may detect these rootkits on the appropriate platform,
but this experiment does not test them due to platform dependencies. The method is also
ineffective against tests 9 and 25 because those rootkits require network connectivity to
function and the test environment prohibits this capability. These seven tests skew the
detection results because the rootkits do not run, so they do not provide anything for the
method to detect. Table 4.4 shows the results of the experiment after removing these tests
and the validation set from the data set. The false negative rate reduces to 59.375% and the
true positive rate increases to 40.625%.
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The tests capture timing data from the time the Windows partition powers on until
the time the Ubuntu partition completes shutdown. The clean results range in time from
164 seconds to 182 seconds, with an average of 172 seconds. The infected results range in
time from 150 seconds to 169 seconds, with an average of 156 seconds. A separate VM
performs the analysis of the results, with an average of 30 seconds to connect the USB
drive and obtain the difference file. The method’s detection time is more consistent than
the 120 to 600 second range that Strider GhostBuster reports, rejecting the hypothesis that
the clean boot method using partitions would require more time to complete than other
methods [34]. Figure 4.1 shows the timing data for the 16 true positive results. The lower
portion of each column is the time the system runs in Windows, and the upper portion is
the time the system runs in Ubuntu.
4.2 Limitations
By definition, rootkits hide their presence on an infected system. While rootkits use
many techniques to remain undetected, not all rootkits employ all stealth techniques. This
method only detects rootkits that hide files and directories. Some rootkits, such as Fu,
FuTo, and associated variants, do not hide files or directories from the user.
Rootkit setup is the most difficult and variable portion of testing. As explained in
Chapter 3, if no instructions accompany the rootkit, the experimenter installs the rootkit
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Figure 4.1: Rootkit detection time for true positive results
by running the dropper executable in a command prompt. In many cases, running the
executable does not install the rootkit correctly. If the rootkit does install correctly by
running the executable, it may not hide files from the user unless the attacker specifies
those files. Instructions on how to specify those files do not accompany the rootkits.
To maintain host integrity and simplify test case transition, the experiment runs all
tests in VMware. Running the tests in VMware introduces a limitation because advanced
malware can detect a virtual environment and then terminate itself. These tests do not
detect such malware, but that kind of malware would run on a host machine, operationally
decreasing the false negative rate for the method.
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Some rootkits reside in volatile memory and are not persistent. The detection method
restarts the system, removing all evidence of the rootkit. The method does not detect the
rootkit in that case because the detection method inadvertently removes the rootkit.
Windows 7 has default protection mechanisms to prevent infection. Fewer rootkit
samples exist that successfully install on Windows 7 than Windows XP because of these
mechanisms, making it difficult to find working samples. Windows XP is older than
Windows 7, so more rootkits and rootkit variants exist for Windows XP. Many of the
malware samples that currently infect systems have not been distributed to researchers
because the systems are not protected against them. The samples are distributed after
patches have been created.
4.3 Vulnerabilities
When Windows XP shuts down, it modifies and adds files to two folders: “System
Volume Information\ restore{#-#-#-#}” and “Windows\Temp\Perflib Perfdata ”.
Because those folders still change after the method obtains the Windows directory listing,
the method assumes any changes in those folders are legitimate. An attacker could design
the rootkit to place the hidden files in one of those folders and the rootkit would evade this
particular implementation of the method.
The Ubuntu partition is the clean partition in this experiment. To avoid detection, an
attacker could potentially compromise the clean partition before the user runs the detection
method. The attacker would then be able to modify the detection implementation code in
Ubuntu to falsely report that no differences in the directory listings exist. To prevent an
attacker from compromising the clean partition, the user must disable network connections
before booting into Ubuntu and scan removable media before connecting it to the clean




Many rootkits hide malware on Windows XP. The user should keep DEP on for all
programs to prevent some rootkits from executing. The use of AV software can potentially
help a user detect and remove rootkits as they install. However, a rootkit that is already on
the machine when the user installs an AV may be able to hide itself from the AV. The clean
boot method presented can help determine if a rootkit that hides files or folders resides on
the system before installing AV software.
Windows 7 has better protection mechanisms than Windows XP, so users should
run Windows 7 if possible. Windows 7 utilizes UACs, which require a user to input an
administrator password when programs try to make changes to the system. Users should
keep UAC on to ask the user for permission before potential malware modifies the system.
A user should only allow programs verified by a reliable source to make changes. In
addition to UAC, users should run an AV program to detect and remove rootkits. AVs
use other techniques to detect rootkits, such as signature-based detection.
4.5 Potential Operational Uses
Many organizations can employ the clean boot detection method to detect rootkits on
their systems. Large enterprises could benefit from running the method on all computers
daily. On average, the method takes less than three minutes to run, so a company could run
the method after employees leave without negatively impacting the organization’s work.
Running the method every night allows an administrator to observe the differences in
hidden files each day. The administrator can set up the method to report only new hidden
files, making it manageable for the administrator to determine the origin of each hidden
file. If the method detects a hidden file on a user’s computer that was not there previously,
the administrator knows that a rootkit or other program hid the file between the last two
reports. That time frame can help determine what program hid the file.
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Some benign applications may legitimately hide files. The administrators can filter
those files out of the results if they trust the programs that hid the files. The administrator
can use this method to determine which user accounts contain hidden files. These accounts
can be isolated to minimize the potential for the infection to spread. Early rootkit detection
is necessary because in a short time the number of malware infections across a network can
increase exponentially after the initial infection. The method presents the location of the
hidden files to the administrator, giving an indication of where the rootkit resides and what
information the rootkit hides.
4.6 Summary
This chapter presents the results of the experiment testing the clean boot method. The
results document the hidden files that the method detects, characterize the attributes of the
rootkits that hid those files and detail why the tests of other samples do not produce the
expected results. Limitations of the experimental setup prevent the method from working
properly in some tests. This chapter documents the vulnerabilities of the method and its
implementation, describes how an attacker could exploit those vulnerabilities, and provides




The clean boot rootkit detection method evaluated in this thesis provides distinct
advantages over other detection methods. While behavioral rootkit detection methods
produce many false positives, the clean boot method produces no false positives in these
tests. The method can detect unknown rootkits if they hide files, unlike signature-based
methods. The clean boot method is less expensive than hardware-based detection methods.
Like integrity checkers, the method obtains an initial baseline to determine what differences
exist while both the target and clean OSs are clean. However, the clean boot method
primarily focuses on the differences in the directory listings and only refers to the baseline
when those differences exist.
The setup of this method is different from other cross-view detection methods because
it utilizes a second OS partition on the disk. A user can run the method immediately
because both views of the system are available at all times. Rootkit detection methods that
utilize a low-level scan as the trusted view while running on the compromised system are
vulnerable to manipulation by some Windows rootkits. To modify the trusted view in the
clean boot method, a rootkit must modify both OSs, which is more difficult.
5.1 Results and Limitations
In addition to maintaining a 0% false positive rate, the clean boot method correctly
detects 40.625% of the rootkits tested on Windows XP. Limitations such as improper rootkit
installation, rootkits that do not hide files, and rootkits that detect VMware contribute
to the high false negative rate. In operation, the false negative rate should be lower
because attackers will install the rootkits correctly on host systems. The rootkits that install
correctly on Windows XP do not install correctly on Windows 7. While Windows 7 rootkits
exist, the ones available on kernelmode.info crash with this system setup.
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5.2 Operational Uses
The experiment runs with a 100% true negative rate, only reporting hidden files when
a rootkit is present. Enterprise networks could benefit from running an implementation of
the method similar to the one in this thesis routinely. The method would report a limited
number of hidden files to an administrator, which the administrator could investigate.
Companies could detect and contain malware infections before they spread to the entire
network by routinely running this method.
5.3 Contributions
This thesis presents operational data, potential uses, and results for the clean boot
methodology. The experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of using a second partition as
the clean operating system. The second partition makes the implementation self-contained
while doing an offline scan. This thesis provides a succinct tabular summary of previous
rootkit detection research and provides results for a larger set of rootkits than other research
tests. Lastly, the thesis describes the limitations of the method and explains defensive
measures to protect the system from rootkits.
5.4 Future Work
Possible future work is to show that a similar clean boot method detects Windows 7
rootkits. The experiments on Windows 7 rootkits may require host-based tests to eliminate
the problems with rootkits that detect VMware. Another modification to the clean boot
method would utilize a network boot into a clean OS, eliminating the need for a clean
partition. The method collects the directory listings from each computer on the network,
then reboots into a centralized clean OS that obtains a directory listing for each system and
compares the lists.
Other future work includes modifying the method to minimize the vulnerabilities
presented in Section 4.3. The method currently assumes that all changes in the “restore”
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and “temp” folders are legitimate. Removing that assumption requires the method to report
all hidden files in those folders. The method can maintain a baseline of legitimately hidden
files in those folders, minimizing the number of files an administrator would view as hidden.
The administrator can add the new, benign files to the baseline after each run of the method
and investigate unexpected hidden files. The method would not be able to report detection
of a rootkit until an administrator views this file list.
5.5 Thesis Summary
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduces the problems created by rootkits and the malware
they hide. Information about rootkits, stealth techniques, and current detection methods
constitutes Chapter 2. Chapter 3 describes a process to implement and evaluate the clean
boot detection method. The research tests the clean boot method and analyzes the results,
determining the limitations and vulnerabilities of the system, as Chapter 4 describes.
Finally, Chapter 5 provides recommendations for protection from malware and future work
in rootkit detection.
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Appendix A: False Negatives





Executable visible to user: yes
2. RtKit - the text on the command line says “The Ntrootkit can only be run in





Executable visible to user: yes
3. ZeroAccess - the text on the command line says “Application cannot be run in












Executable visible to user: no





Executable visible to user: yes
7. Nuclear Rootkit - the user must open the editor and create a file to hide. The editor
creates an executable called rootkit.exe, which the user runs. The instructions on how
to properly set up the rootkit are unclear, because the file that should hide never exists on






Executable visible to user: yes
8. RtKit - the system crashes, displays a Stop Error, and restarts the computer. After
restart, it displays the Stop Error again. The rootkit modifies the system in a way that causes
the system to fail. The test cannot run the detection method in this case because the system






Executable visible to user: N/A
9. RtKit2 - a message indicates that the rootkit requires an Internet connection to run.

















Executable visible to user: no
18. Sinowal - upon shutdown, VMware provides the message, “A fault has occurred
causing a virtual CPI to enter the shutdown state.” After restarting the VM, the same
message appears and shuts it down again. The test of the detection method cannot run
on this system because it cannot restart.
Processes created: sinowal.exe, svchost.exe, 1.tmp, 3.tmp
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Processes terminated: sinowal.exe, svchost.exe
Services created: service1, service2
Services terminated: service3






Executable visible to user: no
25. Zbot -a message indicates that this rootkit requires an Internet connection to
function properly. Because of the nature of the malware, tests run without network
connectivity, so this rootkit does not function properly.
Processes created: uk.exe, zecic.exe
Processes terminated: uk.exe, zecic.exe
Services created: none
Services terminated: none
Executable visible to user: no












Executable visible to user: no
28. Sirefef
Processes created: trol.exe, cmd.exe
Processes terminated: trol.exe, cmd.exe
Services created: none
Services terminated: none
Executable visible to user: no
29. Zaccess
Processes created: dropped.exe, cmd.exe, explorer.exe
Processes terminated: dropped.exe, cmd.exe, explorer.exe
Services created: none
Services terminated: none
Executable visible to user: no
30. Duqu - the text on the command line says “Application cannot be run in Win32





Executable visible to user: yes
31. Alureon - a license agreement box appears to install the program UNICCode.
After following the installation procedures, the UNICCode application is available to the






Executable visible to user: no
32. Sinowal
Processes created: backdoor.exe, regsvr32.exe, svchost.exe
Processes terminated: backdoor.exe
Services created: service1, service2, service3
Services terminated: none
Executable visible to user: yes
34. Alureon - a license agreement box appears to install the program AccessMV.
After following the installation procedures, the AccessMV application is available to the
user. AccessMV does not appear to hide any files.

















Executable visible to user: yes





Executable visible to user: yes
41. Hijack - a message appears that DEP has terminated the program. After disabling
DEP, the executable does not create or terminate any processes when it runs.










Executable visible to user: yes
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Appendix B: Windows 7 Results
5. Vanquish cannot install under the user account. With UAC off and compatibility
mode on, the files are visible. When running a command window as an administrator, the
files do not hide. Even after running the Vanquish setup commands from an administrator
account, the files are visible to the user.
11. TDL2 runs and the UAC asks if the user wants to run the executable as an
administrator. After the user chooses “yes,” the message “TDL2.exe has stopped working”
appears whether the user enables or disables compatibility mode. The rootkit does not work
because TDL2 is only for Windows XP. TDL4 is the variant that should work on Windows
7. Kernelmode.info provides a sample of TDL4. When executed, the dropper disappears,
but the system immediately crashes with an error screen and restarts. The system does not
recover after the restart.
13. Haxdoor does not run until the user disables UAC. The Windows 7 Action
Center detects it as “potentially harmful software” and suggests that the user removes the
executable. Even after allowing the program to run through the Action Center, the rootkit
does not work.
14. Conga crashes during each installation on Windows 7, even with UAC off and
compatibility mode on.
15. Srizbi crashes during each installation on Windows 7, even with UAC off and
compatibility mode on.
16. Nailuj does not add any files when run in a command prompt with or without
administrator privileges, even with compatibility mode on.
17. Pandex disappears when the executable runs with UAC on and compatibility
mode off. The clean partition’s directory listing does not include the file, indicating that the
program deleted the file. The same is true when UAC is off and compatibility mode is on.
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19. Crot runs and a license agreement for “Setup FLV” appears. After agreeing
and installing the program, the system reports “Access Denied.” When Crot runs as
an administrator, the message “Application has stopped working” appears, even with
compatibility mode on.
20. Cosmu requests administrative privileges to run. After Cosmu attains those
privileges, the message “potentially harmful software detected” appears in the Action
Center and asks the user to allow or remove the software. After allowing the software
to run, the directory listings are the same. Running Cosmu as an administrator with
compatibility mode on produces the same results.
22. Blakken runs and the message “potentially harmful software detected” appears
in the Action Center. After allowing the software, the message “BlackEnergy2.exe
has stopped working” appears. The rootkit crashes as an unprivileged user and as an
administrator, with and without compatibility mode on.
23. Scar disappears when the executable runs. A compatibility screen appears
instructing the user to reinstall Scar with compatibility settings. After reinstalling Scar
with those settings and running as an administrator, no files hide.
24. Crisis does not show signs of execution. When Crisis runs as an administrator in
compatibility mode, no files hide.
33. Alureon runs and the UAC asks the user to run the program as an administrator.
When running as an administrator, the message “potentially harmful software detected”
appears. After allowing the software to run, the directory listings are the same. Turning
compatibility mode on and off does not produce different results.
35. TDSS runs and the UAC asks the user to run the program as an administrator. The
message “Microsoft Windows Operating System has stopped working” appears, followed
by “potentially harmful software detected.” When running in compatibility mode as an
administrator, no files hide.
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38. Zeroaccess runs and the executable disappears. The message “potentially harmful
software detected” appears. After allowing the software to run, no files hide. When the
program runs in compatibility mode as an administrator, the executable disappears, but no
files hide.
39. AFX runs according to the instructions provided, but does not hide the folder or
files. Even when run as an administrator in compatibility mode, AFX does not hide the
folder. The clean boot method confirms that no hidden files exist.
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Appendix D: Windows Source Code
Windows Batch File
@echo o f f
py thon walk . py
pause
shutdown − r − t 0
Walk.py in Windows
# ! / u s r / b i n / env p y t ho n
import os
from os . p a t h import j o i n , g e t s i z e
i f os . name == ’ p o s i x ’ :
ba se = ’ / windows / ’
e l s e :
b a se = ’ / ’
a l l f i l e s = l i s t ( )
f o r r o o t , d i r s , f i l e s in os . walk ( base ) :
f o r f in f i l e s :
a l l f i l e s . append ( ( os . p a t h . j o i n ( r o o t , f ) [ l e n (
base ) : ] + ’ \n ’ ) . r e p l a c e ( ’ \\ ’ , ’ / ’ ) )
n e w f i l e = open ( ’ n e w f i l e ’ , ’w’ )
n e w f i l e . w r i t e l i n e s ( s o r t e d ( a l l f i l e s ) )
n e w f i l e . c l o s e ( )
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Appendix E: Ubuntu Source Code
# ! / u s r / b i n / env p y t ho n
import os
import s u b p r o c e s s
import s h u t i l
from os . p a t h import j o i n , g e t s i z e
i f os . name == ’ p o s i x ’ :
ba se = ’ / windows / ’
e l s e :
b a se = ’ / ’
a l l f i l e s = l i s t ( )
f o r r o o t , d i r s , f i l e s in os . walk ( base ) :
f o r f in f i l e s :
a l l f i l e s . append ( ( os . p a t h . j o i n ( r o o t , f ) [ l e n ( ba se ) : ] +
’ \n ’ ) . r e p l a c e ( ’ \\ ’ , ’ / ’ ) )
l i n u x f i l e = open ( ’ l i n u x f i l e . t x t ’ , ’wb ’ )
l i n u x f i l e . w r i t e l i n e s ( s o r t e d ( a l l f i l e s ) )
l i n u x f i l e . c l o s e ( )
p = s u b p r o c e s s . Popen ( [ ” d i f f ” , ”−w” , ” l i n u x f i l e . t x t ” , ” /
windows / n e w f i l e ” ] , s t d o u t = s u b p r o c e s s . PIPE )
( p i p e o u t p u t , p i p e e r r ) = p . communicate ( )
d i f f f i l e = open ( ’ d i f f p y t h o n . t x t ’ , ’wb ’ )
d i f f f i l e . w r i t e ( p i p e o u t p u t )
d i f f f i l e . c l o s e ( )
d i f f f i l e = open ( ’ d i f f p y t h o n . t x t ’ , ’ r ’ )
l i n e = d i f f f i l e . r e a d l i n e ( )
e x p e c t e d = open ( ’ e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’wb ’ )
e x p e c t e d . w r i t e ( l i n e )
e x p e c t e d . c l o s e ( )
u n e x p e c t e d = open ( ’ u n e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’wb ’ )
u n e x p e c t e d . w r i t e ( l i n e )
u n e x p e c t e d . c l o s e ( )
whi le l i n e :
i f l i n e [ 0 ] != ’< ’ and l i n e [ 0 ] != ’> ’ :
e x p e c t e d = open ( ’ e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’ a ’ )
e x p e c t e d . w r i t e ( l i n e )
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e x p e c t e d . c l o s e ( )
e l i f ( ’ System Volume I n f o r m a t i o n / r e s t o r e {311 F706D−679B
−42DE−B9D1−4E16B3078E79 } ’ ) in l i n e or ( ’WINDOWS/ Temp /
P e r f l i b P e r f d a t a ’ ) in l i n e :
e x p e c t e d = open ( ’ e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’ a ’ )
e x p e c t e d . w r i t e ( l i n e )
e x p e c t e d . c l o s e ( )
e l s e :
u n e x p e c t e d = open ( ’ u n e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’ a ’ )
u n e x p e c t e d . w r i t e ( l i n e )
u n e x p e c t e d . c l o s e ( )
l i n e = d i f f f i l e . r e a d l i n e ( )
l i n e 2 = ’ \n ’
d i f f f i l e 2 = open ( ’ d i f f p y t h o n 2 . t x t ’ , ’wb ’ )
d i f f f i l e 2 . w r i t e ( l i n e 2 )
d i f f f i l e 2 . c l o s e ( )
f i l e s o u t = open ( ’ f i l e r e s u l t s . t x t ’ , ’wb ’ )
f i l e s o u t . c l o s e ( )
d i f 2 = open ( ’ u n e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’ r ’ )
whi le l i n e 2 :
d i f e x p e c t = 0
d i f 3 = open ( ’ f i l e s t o compare . t x t ’ , ’ r ’ )
l i n e 3 = d i f 3 . r e a d l i n e ( )
whi le l i n e 3 :
i f l i n e 2 . s t r i p ( ) in l i n e 3 . s t r i p ( ) :
d i f e x p e c t = 1
e l i f l i n e 2 [ 0 ] != ’< ’ and l i n e 2 [ 0 ] != ’> ’ :
d i f e x p e c t = 1
l i n e 3 = d i f 3 . r e a d l i n e ( )
i f d i f e x p e c t == 0 :
d i f f f i l e 2 = open ( ’ d i f f p y t h o n 2 . t x t ’ , ’ a ’ )
d i f f f i l e 2 . w r i t e ( l i n e 2 )
d i f f f i l e 2 . c l o s e ( )
i f l i n e 2 [ 0 ] == ’< ’ :
l i n e 2 s h o r t = ’ / windows / ’ + l i n e 2 [ 2 : −1 ]
p = s u b p r o c e s s . Popen ( [ ” f i l e ” , l i n e 2 s h o r t ] ,
s t d o u t = s u b p r o c e s s . PIPE )
( p i p e o u t p u t , p i p e e r r ) = p . communicate ( )
f i l e s o u t = open ( ’ f i l e r e s u l t s . t x t ’ , ’ a ’ )
f i l e s o u t . w r i t e ( p i p e o u t p u t )
f i l e s o u t . c l o s e ( )
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l i n e 2 = d i f 2 . r e a d l i n e ( )
s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e ( ’ l i n u x f i l e . t x t ’ , ’ / media / f l a t w a r e / t e s t 3 /
l i n u x f i l e . t x t ’ )
s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e ( ’ d i f f p y t h o n . t x t ’ , ’ / media / f l a t w a r e / t e s t 3 /
d i f f p y t h o n . t x t ’ )
s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e ( ’ e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’ / media / f l a t w a r e / t e s t 3 /
e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ )
s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e ( ’ u n e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ , ’ / media / f l a t w a r e / t e s t 3 /
u n e x p e c t e d . t x t ’ )
s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e ( ’ d i f f p y t h o n 2 . t x t ’ , ’ / media / f l a t w a r e / t e s t 3 /
d i f f p y t h o n 2 . t x t ’ )
s h u t i l . c o p y f i l e ( ’ f i l e r e s u l t s . t x t ’ , ’ / media / f l a t w a r e / t e s t 3 /
f i l e r e s u l t s . t x t ’ )
os . sys tem ( ” sudo shutdown −h now” )
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